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Abstract 
 
The perlocutionary act of Austin’s trichotomy on speech acts is significantly 
crucial to the understanding of communication, but has attracted the least attention ever 
since its formulation. This paper reviews its studies in the past and discusses the nature 
of perlocution within the framework of pragmatics. A proper understanding of 
perlocution will provide a fresh linguistic approach for literary criticism and will in turn 
shed light on the teaching of literature. 
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F. Liu 
I. The Philosophical Origin of Perlocution 
1. Ordinary Language Philosophy 
Perlocution is rooted in ‘ordinary language 
philosophy’. Logical positivism and ordinary 
language philosophy are two dominant movements in 
twentieth-century philosophy to concern themselves 
with language. Logical positivist philosophers such as 
Bertrand Russell tried to construct artificial languages 
with sufficient constraints to prevent the expression 
of metaphysics in them. Russell and others took the 
view that everyday language is somehow deficient or 
defective, a rather debased vehicle, full of ambiguities, 
imprecision and contradictions. Their aim was to 
refine language, removing its perceived imperfections 
and illogicalities, and to create an ideal language. 
They were principally concerned with the properties 
of sentences which could be evaluated in terms of 
truth or falsity. The response of Austin and his group 
was to observe that ordinary people manage to 
communicate extremely effectively and relatively 
unproblematically with language just the way it is. 
Instead of striving to rid everyday language of its 
imperfections, he argued, we should try to understand 
how it is that people manage with it as well as they do 
(Thomas, 1995, p. 29-30).  
J. L. Austin in Oxford and Wittgenstein in Cambridge 
are the forefathers of this school of philosophy. 
Ordinary language philosophers hold the view that 
the key to, or at least a necessary condition for, finally 
solving philosophical problems lies in some sort of 
detailed attention to ordinary language. The concept 
of speech acts was largely originated by Austin. 
Austin’s basic ideas, which were formed by him in 
the late 1930s, were presented in his lectures given at 
Oxford in 1952–1954, and later in his famous 
William James Lectures delivered at Harvard in 1955. 
These lectures were finally published posthumously 
in his most influential book How to do things with 
words in 1962. Austin’s views have been enormously 
influential in both philosophy and linguistics. After 
his death in 1960, the American philosopher John R. 
Searle and some others developed and systematized 
Austin's ideas. 
2. Austin’s Speech Act Theory and His Initiation of 
Perlocution 
The central tenet of speech act theory is that the 
uttering of a sentence is, or is part of, an action within 
the framework of social institutions and conventions. 
Simply put, saying is (part of) doing. Actions 
performed via utterances are generally called speech 
acts. Austin’s initial distinction made by between 
performatives and constatives was soon to be rejected 
by him in favor of a general theory of speech acts. 
The distinction was later replaced by his threefold 
classification of acts. He made a well-known tripartite 
distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and 
perlocutionary acts.  
(1) The locution is the act of saying something, 
This ‘includes the utterance of certain noises [the 
phonetic act], the utterance of certain words in a 
certain construction [the phatic act], and the utterance 
of them with certain ‘meaning’ in the favorite 
philosophical sense of that word, i.e., with a certain 
sense and with a certain reference [the rhetic act]’ 
(Austin, 1962, p. 92). 
(2) The illocution is the act done in saying 
something. More precisely, an illocution explains in 
what way one is using a locution: ‘for asking or 
answering a question, giving some information or an 
assurance or a warning’, etc. (Austin, 1962, p. 98). 
(3) The perlocution is the act done by saying 
something. ‘Saying something will often, or even 
normally, produce certain consequential effects upon 
the feelings, thoughts, or actions of an audience, or of 
the speaker, or of other persons (Austin, 1962, p. 
101)’ 
Austin’s conception of the locutionary and the 
illocutionary acts has been scrutinized, challenged 
and modified (and drastically so with respect to 
illocutionary act) since the initial formulation of SAT 
in 1962. The perlocutionary act, in contrast, has 
received the least attention (Gu, 1993, p. 405). A 
discussion of perlocution is a tough job in view of the 
fuzziness of the concept since its very birth. Indeed, 
Austin was by no means specific enough about his 
understanding of perlocutions and neither were his 
followers. Austin’s main concern in his SAT is with 
illocutionary act as can be seen from the following 
statement: ‘Our interest in these lecture is essentially 
to fasten on the second, illocutionary act and contrast 
it with the other two (Austin, 1962, p. 103).’ 
Nonetheless, this study will focus its attention on 
perlocution due to the fact that there are some 
important issues which call for further scrutiny and 
criticism. 
 
II. The Related Studies and Major Views on 
Pelocution 
1. The Related Studies 
There are only a small number of papers devoted to 
the study of perlocution: Cohen (1973), Campbell 
(1973), Gaines (1979), Davis (1980), Gu (1993), 
Attardo (1997), Dennis Kurzon (1998), Marcu (2000). 
Marginal discussions within linguistics literature are 
found in e.g. Black (1969), Searle(1969), Sadock 
(1974), van Dijk (1977), Bach and Harnish (1979), 
Leech (1983) and Levinson (1983). These studies 
have contributed, in one way or another, to our 
understanding of perlocution. For example, Campbell 
(1973), Gaines (1979), Gu (1993) tries to pin down 
the role of intention in interpreting perlocutions and 
speech acts; Cohen (1973) makes a distinction 
between ‘direct’ and ‘associated’ perlocutions; Gu 
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(1993) gives a full account of the fallacies such as 
Effect=Act Fallacy that follow from a straightforward 
adoption of the multiplicity, infinity, or causation 
thesis. 
Despite the fact that perlocution is largely ignored by 
linguistis and the study of perlocution is a tough job, 
Davis (in Searle eds. 1980, p. 37-38) provides two 
reasons for the necessity of focusing attention on 
perlocution. First, they are especially interesting for 
certain issues arising in current action theory. Second, 
a proper understanding of perlocutionary acts will 
throw some light on the complex phenomena 
involved in communication. Gu (1994, p.15) also 
emphasizes the significance of studies on perlocution. 
He holds that perlocution is an indespensible part of a 
complete speech act. Perlocution is a very important 
concept for communication. The ignorance of 
perlocution is substantially due to three reasons. First, 
Austin and Searle show much less interest in 
perlocution. Second, perlocution involves some 
extralinguistic factors which are beyond the scope of 
linguistics. Third, the study of perlocution has always 
been concerning Causation Theory. Thus, there is an 
urgent need to clarify and delimit the notion of 
perlocution , whose features will shed new light on 
literary discourse analysis. 
2. Major Views on Perlocution 
There are several different views on perlocution 
which contribute more or less on the understanding of 
perlocution. 
2.1 Austin’s conception 
Perlocutionary acts are the third in Austin’s tri-partite 
nomenclature of speech acts. Austin’s definition of 
perlocution  can be elaborated according to his work 
(1962) from the following five aspects concerning its 
intention, design features, resulting theses, the 
distinction between illocutionary acts and 
perlocutionary acts, as well as the important notion 
‘effects’: 
Firstly, perlocutionary act can be performed both 
intentionally and unintentionally. He said that 
perlocutionary act ‘may be done with the design, 
intention, or purpose of producing them (the 
effects)… (Austin, 1962, p. 101)’.However, he also 
noted later in his book that intention was not a 
necessary condition for a perlocutionary act. 
Secondly, a requirement for the performance of 
perlocutionary acts is that ‘the speaker’s saying 
something will often, or even normally, produces 
certain consequential effects on the feelings, thoughts, 
or actions of his audience, or of the speaker, or of 
other persons...(1962, p. 101)’. This requirement 
involves four defining features as Gu (1993, p. 406) 
listed:  (1) S says something to H; (2) H is affected 
in a certain way; (3) That H is affected is treated as a 
consequential effect of S’s saying something; (4) S is 
therefore attributed with the performance of the 
perlocutionary act.  
Thirdly, the four defining features give rise to four 
theses (Gu, 1993, p. 407-409). They are the 
Multiplicity Thesis, the Infinity Thesis, the Causation 
Thesis and the Intention Irrelevance Thesis. As far as 
the first feature is concerned, Austin writes that ‘[i]t is 
characteristic of perlocutionary acts that the response 
achieved, or the sequel, can be achieved additionally 
or entirely by non-locutionary means: thus 
intimidation may be achieved by waving a stick or 
pointing a gun (Austin, 1962, p. 119).’ Most studies 
ignore the non-verbal means of achieving a 
perlocutionary act. The second feature gives rise to 
two theses, Multiplicity Thesis and Infinity Thesis. 
The Multiplicity Thesis is the view that S’s saying 
many things may jointly contribute to one effect. The 
Infinity Thesis is the view that the issuing of an 
utterance may produce an infinite and indefinite 
number of perlocutionary effects. The Causation 
Thesis derives from the third feature. Davis (1980, 
p.39) introduced three terms, namely, perlocutionary 
cause and perlocutionary effect and perlocutionary act. 
In his understanding, S’s saying something 
(perlocutionary cause) causes H being affected 
(perlocutionary effect). The Causation Thesis seems 
to be fundamental to the conception of the 
perlocutionary act, but it is not without problems. 
Intention Irrelevance Thesis results from the fourth 
feature. The view is that S’s intention is irrelevant as 
to the decision of whether a given act is 
perlocutionary or not.  
Fourthly, to better understand Austin’s notion of 
perlocutionary act, we need to look more closely at 
how he distinguishes illocutionary and perlocutionary 
acts. Austin himself admits that it is the distinction 
between illocutions and perlocutions which seems 
likeliest to give trouble. According to him, 
illocutionary acts are conventional and can be made 
explicit by the performative formula; but 
perlocutionary acts cannot (1962, p.103). Austin used 
three linguistic tests of the illocutionary act to 
distinguish it from the perlocutionary. However, these 
tests seem to be problematic.  
Fifthly, Austin distinguished some senses of 
consequences and effects in connection with 
perlocutionary acts. In the case of the perlocutionary 
act, a rough distinction is made between achieving an 
object and producing a sequel. The two types of 
perlocutionary effects can be illustrated as the 
achievement of a perlocutionary object such as 
convince, persuade, frighten, etc. and the production 
of perlocutionary sequel such as unintended or 
unforeseen effects. According to Austin, because 
illocutionary acts produce their own effects which are 
not perlocutionary in nature. The expected effects 
from illocutionary acts are the utterance’s ‘uptake’ (i.e. 
‘bringing about the understanding of the meaning and 
of the force of the locution’), ‘taking 
effects’(‘bringing about states of affairs in the normal 
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way’), and ‘inviting a response’ (1962, p. 116-118).  
2.2 Searle’s viewpoint 
Searle (1969) modified Austin’s 
Locution/illocution/perlocution system. Searle (1969, 
p. 24-25) presents a theory which is a development of 
the account presented in Austin 1962. Searle claims 
that four acts are characteristically performed in the 
utterance of a sentence: (a) Uttering words 
(morphemes, sentences) = performing utterance acts. 
(b) Referring and predicating = performing 
propositional acts. (c) Stating, questioning, 
commanding, promising, etc. = performing 
illocutionary acts. (d) Persuading, convincing, 
enlightening, edifying, inspiring, etc. = performing 
perlocutionary acts. 
Searle (1969, p. 25) adds Austin’s notion of the 
perlocutionary acts to utterance acts, propositional 
acts and illocutionary acts. Searle substituted for 
‘locution’ the concept of propositional content. He 
states that ‘Correlated with the notion of illocutionary 
act is the notion of the consequences or effects such 
acts have on the actions, thoughts or beliefs, etc. of 
hearers. For example, by arguing I may persuade or 
convince someone, by warning him I may scare or 
alarm him, by making a request I may get him to do 
something, by informing him I may convince him 
(enlighten, edify, inspire him, get him to realize). The 
italicized expressions above denote perlocutionary 
acts’. 
Searle and Vanderveken (1985, p.12) treat 
perlocutionary effects as extra-communicational in 
that it reflects the consequences of communication, 
rather than figuring in its constitution. They think that 
perlocutionary acts are not essentially linguistic, for it 
is possible to achieve perlocutionary effects without 
performing any speech act at all. Illocutionary acts, 
on the other hand, have to do with understanding, so 
they are conventionalizable. According to them, it is 
not possible to have a linguistic convention to the 
effect that such and such an utterance count as 
convincing you, or persuading you, or annoying you, 
or exasperating you, or amusing you. And that is why 
none of these perlocutionary verbs has a performative 
use. 
2.3 Levinson’s elaboration 
Levinson (1983, p. 236-237) reaccounts 
perlocutionary act as: ‘the bringing about of effects 
on the audience by means of uttering the sentence, 
such effects being special to the circumstances of 
utterance’. Levinson (1983, p. 237) observed that it 
seemed to Austin the more troublesome was the 
distinction between illocutionary act and 
perlocutionary act. The illocutionary act is what is 
directly achieved by the conventional force associated 
with the issuance of a certain kind of utterance in 
accord with a conventional procedure, and is 
consequently determinate (in principle at least). In 
contrast, a perlocutionary act is specific to the 
circumstances of issuance, and is therefore not 
conventionally achieved just by uttering that 
particular utterance, and includes all those effects, 
intended or unintended, that some particular utterance 
in a particular situation may cause.  
Levinson calls to attention that the interactional 
emphasis (on what the recipient(s) of an illocutionary 
act must think or do) in Austin’s work has 
unfortunatedly been neglected in later work in speech 
act theory (see Austin, 1962: Lecture IX). 
2.4 Leech’s abandonment 
Leech (1983, p. 199) rethinks the triple classification 
in terms of the process model of communication. In 
the means-ends diagram, we have ‘phonetic’ at the 
bottom, ‘locutionary’ on the upper layer, 
‘illocutionary’ on the third layer from the bottom. To 
include Austin’s perlocutionary act, Leech (ibid., p. 
201) suggests that one can simply add one further 
layer to the hierarchy. Thus, the perlocutionary act 
represents the sequence of events enacted to reach the 
perlocutionary attainment. Leech (ibid., p.202)  
emphasizes that not all perlocutionary acts are 
appropriately represented in his means-ends diagram. 
The perlocutionary effect involved follows as an 
intended result of the hearer’s interpretation of the 
speaker’s illocutionary goal. Leech (ibid., p. 203) 
points out that there are some kinds of causative verbs 
which have been assumed to denote perlocutionary 
acts. A distinction may be made, for example between 
effects which are planned, and those which are not. 
When s bores or embarrasses or irritates his 
audience, in most cases the result is unintended, and 
therefore does not form part of a means-ends analysis. 
Further, there are effects of greater or of less 
directness: the ultimate result of a reproach may be to 
bring about a desired reformation of h’s behaviour; 
but an intermediate result will be that of making h 
feel guilty or sorry.  
Leech doesnot want to get involved too much in the 
illocution vs perlocution, so he observes that it is 
unnecessary to be too deeply concerned with these 
distinctions: “perlocutionary effects do not form part 
of the study of pragmatics, since pragmatic force has 
to do with goals rather than with results” (ibid., p. 
203). 
2.5 Gu’s modification 
Gu (1993) presents an overall review of the theory of 
perlocution and deals with the notions like the 
Multiplicity Thesis, the Infinity Thesis, the Causation 
Thesis, the Intention Irrelevance Thesis and The 
Effect = Act Fallacy. He argues in the paper that the 
current theory of perlocution is fundamentally 
misguided and a fresh approach is called for. He 
considers the Causation Thesis to be the source of 
many problems, and argues that perlocutioary effects 
cannot be said to be ‘caused’ by the utterance as there 
is no one-to-one causal relationship between an 
utterance type and its effects. The fact that this does 
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not happen shows that there is a gap between 
understanding and believing.  
To replace the Causation Thesis, Gu suggests that an 
utterance might be said to “trigger” an act on the part 
of the hearer. He claims that the perlocutionary act is 
not a single act, but a transaction. Gu argues that 
perlocutionary acts should be considered in terms of 
verbal interaction. The effects of an utterance should 
not be explained in terms of causations or acts 
performed by the speaker, but they ‘ought to be 
explained in transactional terms with the recognition 
of hearers as agents of the effects’ (1993, p. 423). 
According to Gu, the hearer is an independent agent 
of the perlocutionary effect or effects and must be 
regarded as an active participant in the transaction. 
The perlocutionary act cannot be said to be performed 
by the S alone. It is a joint endeavour between S and 
H. It involves S’s performance of speech acts and H’s 
performance of response-acts. Therefore, he 
concludes, “the interactive relation between S and H 
is linguistic and communicative” (1993, p. 427).  
Kurzon (1998, p.575) summarizes Gu (1993)’s 
approach as being more pragmatic in everyday sense 
than the other speech act approach, for Gu sees 
perlocutionary acts only in terms of verbal transaction; 
it takes two to make a perlocutionary act – the 
speaker and the hearer. 
2.6 Bach & Harnish’s refinement 
Bach & Harnish (1979) review Austin’s work and use 
much of the basis speech act framework as the 
underpinnings of their own Speech Act Schema 
(SAS). In so doing, they refine some of Austin’s 
characterizations. They agree with Austin that 
perlocutionary acts may actually result in any number 
of related or unrelated effects on the audience, but, 
contrary to Austin, they exclude unintended 
perlocutionary effects from their framework (Bach & 
Harnish 1979, p. 17 & 81). Thus, for Bach & Harnish, 
perlocutionary acts can only be intentional and may 
only cause certain effects, namely “psychological 
states or intentional actions” (ibid., p. 81). 
 
III. A Reclarified Account of  the Nature of 
Perlocution 
1. The Fallacies of the Previous Approaches 
Perlocutions are extremely significant within a theory 
of communication and pragmatics because the normal 
reason for speaking is to cause an effect in H, and S 
typically strives to achieve this by any means s/he can. 
Enlighted by Marcu (2000)’s critique, this study lists 
several fallacies of the previous studies on 
perlocution:  
They are (1) the fallacy of ruling perlocution out of 
the meaning of an utterance and out of the scope of 
pragmatics in general, (2) the dismissal of the role 
that the structure of locutions plays in the success of 
perlocutionary acts, (3) the fallacy of considering 
perlocutionary acts to be simple consequences of 
locutionary acts, (4) the fallacy of attaching little or 
no importance to the role of the speaker in the 
perlocutionary act, (5)  the fallacy of attaching little 
or no importance to the role of the hearer in the 
perlocutionary act, (6)the fallacy of taking no 
consideration of the actually achieved effects in a 
hearer. 
 
2. The  Nature of Perlocution 
Perlocution can be accounted for within a broader 
range of pragmatics and socio-psychology. Speech 
acts are basic units of communication. There are three 
‘forces’ of communication, namely, locution, 
illocution and perlocution. In general, the locutionary 
act, the illocutionary and the perlocutionary act are 
mere abstractions. Every genuine speech-act is a 
combination of the three. Acts of all the three kinds 
are necessary, since they are the performing of 
actions. 
The modern usage of the term pragmatics is 
attributable to the philosopher Charles Morris (1938). 
Morris distinguished three distinct branches of 
inquiry: syntactic, being the study of “the formal 
relation of signs to one another’, semantics, the study 
of ｀the relations of signs to the objects to which the 
signs are applicable’, and pragmatics, the study of 
‘the relation of signs to interpreters’ (Morris, 1938, p. 
6). ‘Pragmatics is concerned with the study of 
meaning as communicated by a speaker (or a writer) 
and interpreted by a listener (or reader)’(Yule, 1996, p. 
3). A study of perlocution has to do with the 
interaction between a speaker (or a writer) and a 
listener (or a reader) in accounting for meaning, so it 
is an indispensable part of pragmatics, dealing with 
largely ignored issues such as the hearer’s reception 
and the speaker-hearer relationship. 
The structure of locutions plays an essential role in 
the success of perlocutionary act. Structuring a 
message for communicative purpose is very 
important, because different ‘structured’ message 
creates different perlocutionary effects. 
Speech act theory acknowledges only the causative 
role that a speaker has in producing a perlocutionary 
act; however, studies have shown that the background, 
credibility, etc. of the speaker and of the source to 
whom a message is attributed plays an important role 
in achieving perlocutionary effects than theories of 
perlocutions have acknowledged so far. 
A careful analysis of Austin’s definition of 
perlocutions show that he assigns to the hearer a 
passive role in the success of a perlocutionary act. 
However, as Gu (1993) notes in his critique of the 
causation and infinity theses, treating the hearer’s 
response act as a simple consequence of speaker＇s 
speech act denies the status of agent for the hearer. 
‘Perlocutionary act is not a single act, but a 
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transaction＇ . 
According to Grice's theory, S meant-nn something 
by X: this means that speaker intender} the utterance 
of X to produce some effect in an audience by means 
of the recognition of his intention. For Grice, 
meaning has to be interpreted in terms of the hearer 
and so meaning and intention were brought together 
in his analysis. Grice's theory: meaning = intention 
interpreted by the hearer (intention to communicate). 
This can be further explained by Grice's mechanism 
for pragmatic inference. It goes as follows: X intends 
to bring about a response on the part of Y by getting 
Y to recognize that X intends to bring about that 
response; Y does recognize X's intention, and is 
thereby given some sort of reason to respond just as 
X intends him to.Grice’s semantic theory revolves 
entirely around the perlocutionary dimension of 
language, that is, around the reception of speech acts 
and its impact on the hearers. Gricean semantics 
remains the most elaborate account of the semantic 
significance of perlocutionary effects on the audience 
(Medina, 2005, p. 29). Jose Medina (2005, p. 28) 
points out that a theory of meaning must not only take 
into account the illocutionary force of utterances, but 
must also pay attention to their perlocutionary effects. 
The perlocutionary dimension of language also has 
semantic significance. The effects of an utterance on 
its audience or receptors can also affect its meaning. 
From a communicative perspective, perlocution 
should not be ruled out of the meaning of an 
utterance. 
Intentions are not sufficient for meaning construction. 
Perlocutionary effects can be intended or unintended. 
In addition to intentions, it is a certain kind of 
convention or some kind of rule that is necessary for 
meaning. Perlocutionary effects are, to some extent 
indeterminate, but they are determinable, to some 
extent. 
 
IV. A Tentative Taxonomy of Perlocution 
Based on the analysis above, this study gives a 
tentative taxonomy of perlocution. One utterance will 
result in three kinds of perlocution simultaneously. 
They are Explicative perlocution, Implicative 
perlocution and Evocative perlocution. all three levels 
are presumed to be correlated with psychological 
factors in human beings. 
Explicative means ‘tending to lay open to an 
understanding’. On this level, perlocutionary acts are 
taken to be consequences of locutionary acts. The 
effects start with the hearer’s recognition and 
acceptance of the content of an utterance. 
Perlocutions bear some sort of relationship to 
linguistic form. A speaker’s utterance literally causes 
some effects in the hearer. Explicative perlocution is a 
bridge linking surface forms with particular 
communicative goals. 
Implicative means ‘tending to suggest or imply’. On 
this level, the same meaning will arise between 
speaker (writer) and hearer (reader). Perlocutions are 
direct and in-built consequences of illocutionary acts. 
Perlocutionary effects are achieved through intention 
recognition. Austin’s “uptake” may be included in 
this kind of perlocution. The hearer understands both 
the force and the content of an utterance. 
Evocative means ‘(of ) that produces memories and 
feelings’. Speaker’s saying something may produce 
multiple effects on the hearer. The number of 
individuals to be affected can be more than one, and 
the effects may differ from one individual to another. 
The hearer in this case must be a rational agent. 
The three levels interact in complex ways: they are 
not isolated and autonomously packaged ingredients 
of utterances that can be analyzed independently of 
one another. One of the latest (and probably the most 
illuminating) approaches to perlocutions is due to 
Davis (1979). He claims that in a performance of a 
perlocutionary act the conditions to be fulfilled 
concern not only the successful performance of an 
illocutionary act or propositional act in uttering p, but 
also the role of communicative competence shared by 
speaker S and hearer H in a particular language. Thus, 
the assumption that a perlocution is an act strictly 
related to S's and H's communicative competence 
should be a governing factor in the investigations of 
speech acts. 
In sum, the existing accounts of perlocution are 
inadequate. A clarified account of perlocution can 
enrich speech act theory. The taxonomy proposed 
here will more powerfully account for the mechanism 
of literary discourse, which previous studies on the 
application of speech act theory  to literary works 
have never dealt with. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Although Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) identified 
perlocution as a speech act, this concept has been 
largely ignored. The existing accounts of perlocution 
are inadequate. Little attention has been given to the 
hearer’s emotions and the speaker-hearer relationship 
in prior research on speech acts. This study tries to 
show that perlocution, like locution and illocution, 
similarly warrants as much linguistic attention. This 
study has made a theoretical clarification of 
perlocution. It seeks to give a revised account of the 
notion of perlocution. The exploration into the nature 
of perlocution can provide a tool of analysis for the 
interpretation of literature and offer the literary critic 
new methods to account for the complexities of the 
way formal and contextual features interact in the 
reception and interpretation of literary discourse. 
Morever, the understanding of perlocution can help 
students and teachers alike solve problems of 
interpretation by showing them in a rigorous way 
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why one interpretation is possible but not another, and 
thus enhance their aesthetic appreciation and 
emotional reaction of a poetic discourse.  
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